“School of Philosophy”
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| Paper IPM / Philosophy / 12755 |
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| Abstract: | |
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Although it is widely recognized that perceptual experience confers justifi cation on the beliefs it
gives rise to, it is unclear how its epistemic value should be properly characterized. Liberals hold,
and conservatives deny, that the justifi cation conditions of perceptual beliefs merely involve
experiences with the same content. Th e recent debate on this question has, however, seen further
fragmentations of the positions involved with the disputants seeking to identify intermediate
positions between liberalism and conservatism. In this paper, I suggest a framework to account
for the diff erences and similarities of the positions within the liberalism/conservatism debate.
More importantly, I suggest that, instead of focusing on one particular species of conservatism,
we should recognize varieties of conservatism. My conclusion is that no theory of justifi cation
need be conservative or liberal tout court . Whether a theory of justifi cation is liberal or
conservative depends on which dimension of evaluation is taken to be salient. Th e implications
of this fi nding for the liberalism/conservatism debate are then investigated.
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